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REAL PROPERTY-1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY
THOMAS G. ROADY. JR.*
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I. TITLES AND DEEDS
1. Title Acquired by Partition Deed:-In a series of decisions
stretching from 19011 to 19602 it has been established as a rule of law
(not of construction) that a voluntary deed of partition passes no new
title and creates no new estate but merely effects a severance of
possession, whereby an estate theretofore owned jointly is thereafter
owned in severalty. While it is the opinion of many conveyancers that
this is an unfortunate development, one cannot quarrel with the
court's application of it in Johnson v. Beard in the face of such
3
strong precedents.
The Johnson case is typical of those applying the aforesaid rule.
Three daughters, who had inherited a tract of land from their
father, agreed to exchange deeds with the obvious intent to sever
the tenancy in common existent in the tract. The deed to one of the
daughters, executed by the other two, named her and her husband
as grantees. She died intestate in 1942 survived by her husband and
several children. The surviving husband died in 1958 leaving a will
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Advisor, Vanderbilt

Law Review; member, Tennessee and Illinois Bars.
1. Holt v. Holt, 185 Tern. 1, 202 S.W.2d 650, 173 A.L.R. 1210 (1947); Manhatten Say. Bank v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187, 30 S.W.2d 227 (1920); Cottrell

v. Griffiths, 108 Tenn. 191, 65 S.W. 397 (1901); Samples v. Samples, 8 Tenn.
2. Johnson v. Beard, 332 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1960).

App. 211 (E.S. 1928).

3. This rule has been so vigorously applied that in Samples v. Samples, 8
Tenn. App. 211 (E.S. 1928), it was held that a husband named as sole grantee
in a deed acquired no beneficial interest thereunder. On the facts it appeared
that the deed was made as part of the voluntary partition of an interest of

his wife. Therefore, he held the title in trust for her use and benefit and the
title passed to the devisees named in her will.
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in which he devised the land described in the partition deed to his
second wife. She brought an action to determine her interest in
the premises. The chancellor ruled that she acquired no interest
because her husband had acquired no title by virtue of the partition
deed to himself and his first wife. The supreme court affirmed the
chancellor, referring to the partition deed rule as "a settled rule of
property ' 4 in this state.
It is to be hoped that on the next occasion on which the supreme
court is confronted with the partition deed rule that it will analyze
it and the fact situation carefully with a view to abandoning it is a
rule of law. The rule is a court made (common law) one and
developed at a time when there was considerable emphasis placed
on the need for the four unities to establish joint estates in land.5
During the period it has been applied, many developments in the
law of property run counter to the arbitrary application of any
rule of construction that tends to disregard the intent of the parties
to an instrument. 6 It would seem to be time for the court to determine
if there still exists any valid reason for continuing to apply the rule
of the Johnson case. If there is not, it should be abolished. Rules
arbitrarily applied, when they tend to defeat the intent of parties to
an instrument, are unreasonable. There are few who honestly believe
that the partition deed rule does other than defeat the intent of the
parties to a deed.7
Certainly it would seem that the court can escape the rule whenever other than a man and wife are the grantees in the partition
deed.8 But they would have great difficulty, in view of the broad
4. 332 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1960).
5. See the discussion in Holt v. Holt, 185 Tenn. 1, 202 S.W.2d 650 (1947)
and cases and texts cited therein. See also Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266
S.W. 110 (1924).

6. The legislature on at least two occasions has acted within recent years.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-109 (1956) permits the creation of an estate by
entireties by direct conveyance. TENN. CODE AmN. § 36-602 (1956) clearly
indicates legislative sympathy with the creation of estates by the entireties.
Much longer ago, the legislature of Tennessee abolished the Rule in Shelley's
Case which had previously been arbitrarily applied to defeat the apparent
intent of parties to an instrument. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-103 (1956). In

addition the courts of Tennessee have on numerous occasions shown a preference for tenancies by the entireties. Ballard v. Farley, 143 Tenn. 161, 226
S.W. 544 (1920); Bennett v. Hutchens, 133 Tenn. 65, 179 S.W. 629 (1915); Cole
Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895). The courts have often
been quite liberal in giving effect to the intention of parties and reluctant
to follow arbitrary rules in construing this intent. See particularly Runions
v. Runions, 186 Tenn. 25, 207 S.W.2d 1016 (1948); Dalton v. Eller, 153 Tenn.
418, 284 S.W. 68 (1926); Southern Ry. v. Griffitts, 304 S.W.2d 508 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1957); Higginson v. Smith, 38 Tenn. App. 223, 272 S.W.2d 348 (M.S. 1954).
7. To hold that a grantee named in a deed acquires no beneficial interest
thereunder as a matter of law is palpably illogical. If all the parties have
accomplished is a recognition of the marital rights of a spouse, as in the
cases applying the partition deed rule, then why name them at all?
8. Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110 (1924).
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language in which the rule has been stated in the past, to escape it
where the grantees are husband and wife even though in the partition
deed the intent to create a tenancy by the entireties was clearly
indicated. 9 This emphasis on what once was a highly technical aspect
of the law of conveyances is no longer justified. If the court will not
abolish this rule, then they should at least point out the need for
legislation when the next opportunity occurs.
2. Conveyance to a Public or Private Corporation Having Power
of Eminent Domain:-It is a general rule that the interest or estate
acquired by the condemnor in an eminent domain proceeding is
only such as is required to accomplish the purpose which gave rise
to the action. As a consequence, whenever it becomes necessary to
determine the extent of the interest acquired in such a proceeding, all
doubts and ambiguities are resolved in favor of the owner. The
result of this rule limits the interest of the condemning authority
to an easement if this is sufficient to enable it to carry out its purpose,
and only where land is conveyed in fee by voluntary deed or when the
fee is necessary to achieve the purposes for which the land is taken
will the owner's interests be extinguished completely. This is contrary to the rule of construction in the ordinary voluntary conveyance
which would allow the grantee the greatest interest possible. 10
The rule developed in the eminent domain cases has had an impact
on the construction of deeds, voluntarily executed, when the grantee
therein has available the power of eminent domain but has not used
it. The ordinary rule of construction favoring the grantee is not
followed as readily when the grantee in a deed is a public or private
corporation possessing the authority to condemn.
A case illustrative of this point is Lillard v. Southern Ry.11 In
this case the supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Prewitt, affirmed
the Circuit Court of McMinn County in holding that the railway company had acquired only an easement or right-of-way in certain land
rather than the fee. It is true that the language of the conveyance
contained the term "right-of-way" but other language in the deed
would appear to support a holding that a fee was acquired.
The authority in support of the court's holding is ample and
respectable, 12 and cases which seem to give some support to a con9. "To A and B, husband and wife as tenants by the entireties, with right
of survivorship." If this would not suffice, a straw man arrangement would
be needed or a subsequent direct conveyance under TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-

602 (1956) by the spouse who acquires the sole interest under the partition
deed.

10. 6 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 163-65 (1950).
11. 330 S.W.2d 335 (Tenn. 1959).
12. Southern Ry. v. Vann, 142 Tenn. 76, 216 S.W. 727 (1919); McLemore
v. Charleston & M.R.R., 111 Tenn. 639, 69 S.W. 338 (1902).
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trary result can be distinguished. 13 The moral to these cases is that
whenever the grantee in a deed is a public or private corporation
having the power of eminent domain special care should be exercised
in describing the nature of the estate conveyed.
3. Champertous Conveyances:-The case of Blair v. Gwosdof' 4 is
another in a long series of decisions involving an application of the
Tennessee statutes prohibiting champertous conveyances. 15 In this
case the complainant was given a decree removing a certain deed as a
cloud on complainant's title. The decision was sustained by the court
of appeals where the facts appeared that the deed under which
defendants claimed was executed while complainant was in adverse
possession of the premises. Citing Kincaid v. Meadows,16 Judge Felts
construes the statutes as making "utterly void every sale or grant of
land adversely held, without regard to the length of adverse possession
and without regard to whether the vendor's title is valid or invalid."'1
It is unfortunate that the statutes in this state on which such
decisions as the instant one are based have not long since been
repealed or modified. It is becoming more and more apparent that
the courts cannot be expected to lessen the oftentimes arbitrary and
seemingly unjust result which flows from the literal application of
these statutes. The instant case would have been an excellent one in
which to permit the defendant to establish the title of his grantors on
the merits. But in spite of the desirability of relaxing the rigorous
enforcement of such statutes, 18 the court continues to regard possession
at the time of the disputed conveyance as determinative of a deed's
validity, even though the grantor in such deed might have had the
legal title at the time it was executed and delivered.
II.

EMINENT DOMAIN

Three cases involving the Tennessee law of eminent domain were
decided during the survey period. One of them was by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee and two were federal court cases.
In Hopper v. Davidson County19 the supreme court reversed the
Circuit Court of Davidson County which had sustained a demurrer
13. Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry.v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661, 39 S.W.2d 1026 (1931);
Burnett v. Nashville & C.R.R., 36 Tenn. 528 (1857).
14. 329 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
15. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-406, -407 (1956).

16. 40 Tenn. 188 (1859).

opinion.

17. 329 S.W.2d 366 at 368.

Numerous other decisions are also cited in the

18. For an excellent discussion of the statutes and Tennessee decisions see
Trautman, Real Property, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1080 (1953); Trautman and Kirby,
Real Property-1954 Survey, 7 VAND.L. REV. 921 (1954).
19. 333 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. 1960).
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by the county to plaintiff's action to recover damages for the taking
of private property and had denied the petition of plaintiff to amend.
While admitting that the declaration had been poorly drawn, Justice
Burnett pointed out that plaintiff had obtained different counsel who
requested permission to amend. He further pointed out that a
favorable ruling on this petition would not have permitted any unfair
advantage to be taken of defendant. The supreme court was reluctant
to reverse the lower court in a matter normally regarded as discretionary with a trial judge but in this instance it was felt that an injustice
would be done if such action was not taken.
It appears that the lower court had thought that the action of
trespass for damages as brought would not lie. The supreme court
thought otherwise and cited section 23-1423 of the Code in support of
20
its position.
The case is significant in that there is spelled out in the opinion
the measure of damages due a lessee when his property is taken by
condemnation proceedings. 21 While this point was not in issue, the
statement should be helpful on further proceedings.
In Hicks v. United States22 the court of appeals awarded the
condemnee $15,090.00 with interest at 6 per cent per annum on the
portion of the award not previously paid into court from the date of
the taking of the property by the Tennessee Valley Authority. The
commissioners had disagreed on the amount of the award, the
majority determining the damage to be $14,500 and a minority (the
third commissioner) placing the figure at $7,985. On exceptions being
filed to the award and a hearing de novo before a three judge court
waived, the district judge for the Middle District of Tennessee entered
a judgment reducing the award to $7,500. The court of appeals in
considering the entire record "without regard to the awards or
finding theretofore made by the commissioners or the district judges"
came up with the above figure. In so doing, they took into consideration: (1) testimony as to erosion damage which would be
caused by cutting of trees by TVA both within and without the
appellant's property; (2) the fertility of the soil and the average
production in past years; (3) testimony as to the detrimental effect
that unsightly power poles would have over the entire tract of land;
and (4) testimony as to the apprehension of danger to persons or
20. Emphasis is on that language in the code which permits the owner to
initiate an action by certain prescribed procedure, "or he may sue for damages in the ordinary way. . . ." Tm. CODE ANN. § 23-1423 (1956).
21. "Generally speaking, a lessee is entitled to compensation for fixtures,
structures, or other improvements installed or erected by him upon property
taken under eminent domain, if, as against the lessor, he has the right to
remove such improvements prior to or upon expiration of his term." 333
S.W.2d at 920.
22. 266 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1959).
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property caused by the presence of power lines on the land.
"In determining the question whether or not property already
devoted to public use can be subjected to the power of eminent domain, the primary factor to be considered is the character of the
condenmor."23 The case of United States v. Certain Parcels of Land
in Knox County, Tennessee,24 decided during the survey period,
clearly supports this conclusion.
It was urged by a cemetery corporation, one of the defendants in
the proceedings, that the State of Tennessee did not have the power to
acquire through condemnation lands previously dedicated to cemetery
use and to divert said lands to the construction of highways, and the
United States could not, therefore, condemn such land for the purpose
of conveying them to a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee.
It was argued that such use of the land by the United States would
not be a "public one" within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
The cases 25 cited by counsel for the cemetery were analyzed by
the district judge in his opinion and issue taken with the construction
of them given on behalf of defendant. The district judge interpreted
them as standing for the general principle that property devoted to a
public use, selected and set apart by legislative authority, cannot be
taken for another and inconsistent public use in the absence of legislation expressly or impliedly warranting it. This seems to be an accurate view of such cases. This being the principle of law, the United
States could condemn in this instance because in the Federal-Highway Act of 1956 Congress had expressly authorized the taking of land
by the Secretary of Commerce.
All of the above was really unnecessary to the decision. For it
has long been well established that a state or the United States for
its own purposes can acquire property by eminent domain, the fact
that the property sought having already been dedicated to public
26
use imposing no restraint upon the power.
III. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Adverse Possession:-In Pyron v. Colbert27 complainant sought
an injunction to restrain his neighbor to the south from erecting a
fence which would interfere with the use of a driveway. The driveway had been used as an entrance to and exit from complainant's
23. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 131 (1950).
24. 175 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).
25. Southern Ry. v. City of Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S.W. 662 (1912);
Memphis State Line R.R. v. Forest Hill Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn. 400, 94 S.W.
69 (1906).
26. See cases collected 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 132 n. 51 (1950) and
cases cited in instant case at 422, 423.
27. 328 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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property. The chancellor dismissed the bill and the court of appeals
affirmed the chancellor's judgment. On the facts, complainant had
not made a case of any kind for that relief he requested. It appeared
that the original use of such driveway was permissive to the extent
that it encroached on defendant's premises and even if adverse, the
period of time so used was too short to give complainant a prescriptive right therein. In holding that on the facts the complainant was
not entitled to relief, the court observed that in no event could a
complainant use the seven-year statute28 when there was no color of
recorded muniment of title since that statute is purely defensive in
29
nature.
2. Evidence of Title-CriminalAction.:-Yates v. State3Oinvolved an
appeal by certain defendants of their conviction in the County Court
of Fentress County of a criminal trespass. 31 The basis for the appeal
was that the State had failed to prove legal title to or possession of
the land in the prosecuting witness at the time of the alleged trespass.
In the instant case, the timber defendants had cut was on unfenced and unoccupied land.32 It was incumbent on the prosecution,
therefore, to prove ownership within the meaning of the statute
since they could not establish actual possession. The supreme court,
in the opinion by Justice Swepston, said this could only be done in
such circumstances by showing title in the prosecuting witness by
deraignment from the state or from a common source. Since this had
not been done, the convictions of defendants below were reversed.
There had been testimony introduced in the trial of defendants
to the effect that the prosecuting witness had purchased the land
from which the timber was cut and that subsequent to the alleged
trespass he had executed a deed to the premises to his son. This
was not sufficient evidence of title to sustain the action. 33
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-203 (1956).

29. On this point see Moore v. Brannan, 304 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1957), 11 VAND. L. REV. 1373 (1958). See also Note, Title By Adverse Possession in Tennessee, 5 VA=. L. REV. 295 (1954).
30. 332 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. 1960).
31. The statute allegedly violated was TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4521 (1956)
making it a felony ".... knowingly, willfully, and maliciously to cut, or to
remove for the purpose of marketing the same, timber from the lands of
another, without the consent of the owner of the timber."
32. This fact serves to distinguish the case from Clark v. State, 131 Tenn.

372, 174 S.W. 1137 (1915) wherein the prosecuting witness was found to have
constructive possession by virtue of his tenant's cultivation of a portion of the
premises, and Deaderick v. State, 122 Tenn. 222, 122 S.W. 975 (1909) wherein
the prosecuting witness was held to be in actual possession of the land from
which the timber was cut.
33. The court on being confronted with the decision in Pepper v. Gainesboro Tel. Co., 1 Tenn. App. 175 (M.S. 1925) felt compelled to call it an
unsound decision.

That case contained the following language, ".

.

. parol

evidence, unexcepted to, is some evidence upon which the jury predicated its
verdict." 1 Tenn. App. at 178. But the two cases might be reconciled. The
Pepper case was a civil action for damages while the instant case was a
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3. Divided Interests-Waste:-One of the legal principles which
is employed to keep in balance conflicting desires of persons having
interests in the same land is known as waste. While the fact situations
in which the problem of "waste" or "no waste" can arise are almost
infinite in variety,34 in the great majority of cases the alleged
wrongdoer has either a possessory estate for life or a possessory estate
for years. The action ordinarily is at the instigation of the holder of
the future interest, in most such cases a reversion or a remainder.
In Thompson v. Thompson 35 a life tenant sought a declaratory
judgment respecting 'her right to cut and sell certain timber on a
farm. The remaindermen were the defendants. 36 The chancellor
entered a decree that complainant could cut and sell for her own
use and benefit certain cedar and oak timber during the existence
of her life estate. 37 The court of appeals appears to have affirmed
the chancellor in substance for the reason that they believed the
instrument creating complainant's life estate, properly construed,
made such estate unimpeachable for waste and that it was the intent
of the testator that the life tenant be permitted to harvest suitable
timber crops.
Justice Swepston's opinion indicates that the supreme court thought
the court of appeals had misconstrued the decree of the chancellor.
The higher court interpreted the chancellor as finding that the
cutting of timber, subject to the limitations imposed in the decree,
would be beneficial to the farm (interests of defendants?).
Of course, if the possessory estate is held "without impeachment
for waste," a somewhat greater freedom of action is permitted in the
prosecution for a criminal trespass. Certainly, in a criminal action, the court
should insist that prosecuting witness prove beyond reasonable doubt that
he has actual possession or a title which would carry with it constructive
possession.
34. In 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 5-45 (1958) there is an excellent discussion

of the law of waste. After pointing out that the development of this phase of
the common law started at or before the middle of the twelfth century and
tracing it through the nineteenth century, Powell indicates his belief that
the law of waste can best be understood by presenting it in varying combinations of four sets of variables: (a) the type of interests for which protection
is sought-remainder, reversion or executory interest; (b) the type of interest
had by the person against whom the protection is sought-life estate or estate
for years; (c) the exact content of the act or omission as against which protection is asked-destructive or ameliorative; (d) the procedural channel
through which protection is demanded-damages, injunction or declaratory
judgment.
35. 332 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1960).

36. There are very few cases where declaratory judgment is the procedure
invoked to resolve one of these conflicts and this case appears to be one of
the even fewer recent ones. The exact nature of the future interest held by
defendants is not entirely clear. They are referred to as ".

.

. defendant Edd

G. Thompson, individually and on behalf of his children as possible remaindermen. . .

."

332 S.W.2d at 223 (emphasis added).

37. It should be noted that the right to so cut and dispose of the timber
was subjected by the decree to certain restrictions as to size and condition of
the trees.
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use of the premises than where such intent is not found in the
instrument creating the divided interest. But even though such an
intent is expressed, courts of equity have not been reluctant to
interfere where acts of the life tenant are injurious to the reversion
or remainder, and this is particularly true where such acts are wilful,
wanton or malicious in nature. The hostility of courts to the finding
of an intent to give the life tenant complete freedom in dealing with
the premises is evidenced by language in the instant case which would
deny a life tenant the unrestricted right to sell timber for a profit to
those instances where "the language and the surrounding circumstances are reasonably clear in compelling a conclusion to that
effect. ' 38 The view that the will involved in the instant case gave
complainant a life estate without impeachment for waste does not
appear to be a strained one, but it does not seem to be so reasonably
clear as to "compel a conclusion to that effect."
However, after taking issue with the views expressed by the
court of appeals on the above points, the court affirms on the ground
that the cutting and selling of timber for the purpose of enhancing
the value of the farm is not waste. This is certainly a rational ap39
proach and there was strong precedent for using it.
One might pause to wonder why there could be any real question
about the right of a life tenant to engage in any activity that would
prove beneficial to the estate or would fall within the concept of
"good husbandry" of the affected land. The ostensible reason is that
the common-law precedents were decided in England, "a timberscarce agricultural society. '40 This led to decisions limiting the
cutting of timber by a life tenant quite severely. Fortunately, the
trend has been away from the narrow approach of these English
cases and a relaxation of the law of waste as applied to timber cutting
has been accomplished by stressing an actual increase in the value of
the inheritance caused thereby or by accepting the changes in the
'41
land affected in the interests of "good husbandry."
38. 332 S.W.2d at 226.
39. The cases of Lunn v. Oslin, 96 Tenn. 28, 33 S.W. 561 (1896) and Owen v.
Hyde, 14 Tenn. 334 (1834) are landmark cases, the former being widely
cited in other jurisdictions.

40. 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 15 (1958).

41. The English decisions and many of the early ones in the United States
forbade a tenant impeachable for waste to cut any timber save such as was
needed for firewood, fences and building repair. The effect of the early common-law view is still felt in Tennessee even though the attitude portrayed in
Owen v. Hyde and Lunn v. Oslin, supra note 39, is a liberal one. See TENN.
CODE ANN. § 64-804 (1956) which states that "no person holding the temporary
title to real estate, subject to redemption, shall use more of the woodi growing
thereon than the timber required to keep the improvements in good repair,
and firewood necessary for those occupying the same. . . ." See also TENN.
CODE ANN. § 67-1911 (1956) which prohibits the cutting and selling of timber
on land subject to a tax lien, with certain exceptions.
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IV. LANDLORD Am TENANT

Under what circumstances will a lessee be liable to his landlord
for damages to buildings on the leased premises caused by the tortious
act of a sublessee? This question was before the middle section of
the court of appeals in the case of Bishop v. Associated Transport,
Inc.42 The court held the lessee for the destruction of the buildings
caused by an act of arson of a sublessee. Judge Felts dissented without opinion.
Defendant, lessee, had leased the premises from the plaintiff, landlord, by executing a lease containing the following covenants the
court thought relevant to the case: Clause Second, giving the lessee
the right to sublet and assign the lease with a provision that it should
not relieve the lessee of his obligations under the lease; Clause Third,
providing that the lessor would make all structural and roof repairs
with the lessee to be liable for all other repairs "if the condition
requiring repair has been caused by the negligence of the Lessee."
(Emphasis added.); Clause Ninth, providing for a surrender of the
premises at the end of the term "in a reasonably good state of repair,
ordinary wear and tear and damages by fire and the elements" being specifically excepted; Clause Tenth, providing that the lessee
would not conduct any operations on the premises that would increase the rate for fire insurance and would comply with all laws
43
affecting the demised premises.
Subsequent to entering into this lease, the defendant sublet the
property, as he had the right to do under Clause Second of the
lease. Approximately a year later the sublessee deliberatly set fire to
the buildings on the premises, and they were completely destroyed.
For this act, the sublessee was convicted of arson. 44 The chancellor
held the defendant liable on the theory that covenant nine of the
lease had been violated. The court of appeals affirms this result.
It is quite difficult to understand just what theory the court uses in
so doing. Apparently the court felt that the lessee undertook an
obligation by Clause Ninth to respond in damages for any loss by
fire except "fire that occurred by accident or from conditions beyond
the control of the lessee or sublessee .... -145It is difficult to escape
the suspicion that the court really felt that the lessee's liability was
in tort for a substantial part of the opinion is devoted to a discussion
42. 332 S.W.2d 696 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).

43. This clause would appear to indicate that the parties expected the lessor

to keep the premises insured. Such a clause is often a basis for finding that
destruction of the premises is a loss the parties contemplated would be borne
by the landlord.
44. The landlord first sued the sublessee, obviously in tort, and recovered
a judgment of $30,000 against him. Apparently the judgment could not be
collected.
45. 332 S.W.2d at 700.
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of the liability of a lessee for damages to premises caused by an
intentional or negligent act.
As examples of the confusion that exists in the opinion, the court
spends some time making the point that a covenant to keep the
premises in good repair runs with the land. Of course it does! But of
what relevance is that to this decision? Here the landlord is seeking
to recover from his lessee with whom he is in privity of contract 46
and who had expressly covenanted in Clause Second to remain bound
by this contract in the event of a sublease or assignment. Had the
action been against the sublessee on the contract, then it would have
been necessary to discuss the running covenant since the sublessee
not having contracted with the original landlord could only have been
held to the contract if in privity of estate with him.47 Further evidence
of confusion is the lengthy discussion concerning the effect of a clause
excluding damage by "fire and the elements. '48 It is most certainly
true that such an exclusion does not apply where the loss or destruction is caused by the negligence or misconduct of the lessee. But
in what respect was the defendant lessee guilty of negligence or misconduct in this case? The negligence or misconduct was that of a
sublessee and unless one can in some way impute this to the defendant the entire discussion is irrelevant. The sublessee was not an
agent of defendant. Nor is there any evidence in the opinion to
indicate that the defendant was negligent in selecting the sublessee
who was guilty of the tortious act.
But the most difficult portion of the opinion to swallow is that which
construes the exception of damage by fire of Clause Ninth in the
following words:
[W]e do not believe that the parties, by the provisions of the lease,
intended to excuse the lessee from responsibility for fire which was
intentionally set by him or his agent or by a sublessee, and which resulted in the destruction of the buildings on the property.49
The original lessee could not by contract avoid liability for an
intentionally tortious act of himself or his agent. Numerous decisions
indicate that this cannot be done.50 But he could avoid liability for
the acts of the sublessee or other third persons and it is reasonable
46. The lessee could not have escaped his contract obligations without a
novation and nothing like that had occurred.
47. If only a sublease was involved in this case, the plaintiff would have
had no action for breach of the running covenant, for the generally accepted
view is that there is neither privity of contract or privity of estate as between
an original landlord and a sublessee. This reinforces the belief that the
action plaintiff had pursued against the sublessee was in tort.
48. 332 S.W.2d at 701.
49. Id. at 700.
50. See Annots., 45 A.L.R. 12 (1926), 20 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951); see also
LESAR, LANDLORD AND TENANT

349 (1957).
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to believe he intended to do so. 51
The short of it is that this decision seems to this writer to be an
erroneous one, decided on some general equitable principle that as
between a landlord and tenant, destruction of the buildings on the
premises from a cause that never entered their minds should be
borne by the tenant. For the result reached in this case cannot be
explained simply in terms of construing Clause Ninth as not being
effective to relieve the tenant from the obligation to surrender the
premises at the end of the term in a reasonably good state of repair
even though that clause contained damage by fire as an exception. It
goes much further in that the court has in effect said either that the
destruction of the buildings was in this case due to the neglect or
fault of the defendant or that52 he expressly stipulated in writing to
be bound for such destruction.
51. Nor for that reason does it seem logical to assume that the original
lessor intended this result. Lessor first proceeded against the sublessee guilty
of the misconduct. The action against this defendant appears to be something
of an afterthought.
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-703 (1956). No precedent could be found for such
a holding. A number of cases seemed to support a different result. See
authorities cited supra note 50.

